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The Old Poor Law and the Agricultural 
Labor Market in Southern England: An 
Empirical Analysis 
GEORGE R. BOYER 
The paper examines the economic role played by poor relief in early nineteenth-
century England. A three-equation model is estimated to explain cross-parish 
variations in per capita relief expenditures, agricultural laborers' annual wage 
income, and unemployment rates. Relief expenditures are found to be related to 
crop mix, the political power of labor-hiring farmers, distance from London, and 
employment opportunities in cottage industry. The results strongly support the 
revisionist analysis of the Old Poor Law, and reject the analysis contained in the 
Report of the Royal Poor Law Commission. 
ECONOMIC and social historians have expended a large amount of effort analyzing the administration of poor relief in England from 
the passage of Gilbert's Act in 1782 to the adoption of the Poor Law 
Amendment Act in 1834, and with good reason. During the period real 
per capita relief expenditures increased at a rate of nearly 1 percent per 
year. Several explanations have been offered for the rapid increase in 
expenditures: the disincentive effects of generous relief benefits, labor-
ers' loss of land through enclosures and engrossment, the decline of 
employment opportunities in cottage industry for women and children, 
a reduction in wage rates for agricultural laborers. 
To date, however, none of these explanations have been tested 
empirically. In view of the paucity of time-series data this is perhaps not 
surprising. But there is a gold mine of cross-sectional parish level 
information concerning the administration of poor relief, and agricultur-
al labor markets in general, that has been underutilized. I refer to the 
Rural Queries, a questionnaire mailed to rural parishes throughout 
England in 1832 by the Royal Commission to Investigate the Poor Laws, 
and answered by approximately 1,100 parishes. The level of per capita 
relief expenditures differed significantly across counties, and across 
parishes within counties. Presumably the same explanations given for 
the long-term increase in relief expenditures can be used to account for 
Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (March 1986). © The Economic History 
Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507. 
The author is Assistant Professor of Labor Economics at New York State School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14851-0952. 
I wish to thank Ronald Ehrenberg, David Galenson, Donald McCloskey, Joel Mokyr, Jeffrey G. 
Williamson, and the participants at the Economic History workshops at Harvard University, 
Northwestern University, and the University of Chicago for helpful comments. The able research 
assistance of Joshua Schwarz is gratefully acknowledged. 
113 
114 Boyer 
cross-parish variations in expenditures. By combining such information 
with occupational data from the 1831 Census it is possible to test most of 
the hypotheses explaining variations in relief expenditures.1 
I provide here one such test. Data from a sample of southern parishes 
that responded to the Rural Queries are used to estimate a three-
equation model to explain cross-parish variations in per capita relief 
expenditures, agricultural laborers' annual wage income, and the rate of 
unemployment. The results are used to evaluate explanations for the 
increase in expenditures on relief. 
I. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LONG-TERM INCREASE A N D REGIONAL 
VARIATIONS IN RELIEF EXPENDITURES 
Contemporary critics of the Old Poor Law focused on the effects of 
policies granting relief to able-bodied laborers outside of workhouses, 
but they did not explain the widespread adoption of such policies late in 
the eighteenth century. The most important contemporary analysis is 
the 1834 Report of the Royal Commission to Investigate the Poor Law. 
The Report concluded that the rapid increase in per capita relief 
expenditures during the first third of the nineteenth century was caused 
almost entirely by the widespread adoption of outdoor relief during the 
subsistence crises of 1795 and 1800. The system of outdoor relief, 
guaranteeing a minimum level of income, destroyed the motive for 
work. It created voluntary unemployment and lowered the productivity 
of workers who remained employed. Because most outdoor relief 
policies allowed employed laborers to apply for relief, they enabled 
labor-hiring farmers "to reduce wages to the minimum, or even below 
the minimum of what will support an unmarried man, and to throw upon 
others the payment of a part. . . of the wages actually received by their 
laborers."2 The long-term increase in relief expenditures was caused, 
therefore, by increased levels of voluntary unemployment and by the 
ability of farmers to substitute relief payments for wages as compensa-
tion for their workers. 
The hypothesis did not originate with the Poor Law Commissioners; 
it was accepted by nearly every contemporary critic of the Old Poor 
Law. Much earlier Malthus had concluded that the Poor Laws dimin-
1
 To date the only attempt to determine the causes of cross-sectional variations in per capita 
relief expenditures during this period has been by G.S.L. Tucker, "The Old Poor Law Revisited," 
Explorations in Economic History, 12 (1975), pp. 233-52. Tucker's analysis is at the county level of 
aggregation, while poor relief was administered by the parish. Because relief administration and 
economic conditions were not uniform across parishes within a particular county, his analysis has 
serious shortcomings. Moreover, Tucker did not make use of the Rural Queries, and thus was 
unable to test several prominent hypotheses concerning the causes of cross-sectional variations in 
relief expenditures. 
2
 Royal Commission to Investigate the Poor Laws, Report on the Administration and Practical 
Operation of the Poor Laws (London, 1834), pp. 68-70, 233-37, 59. 
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ished workers' "incentives to sobriety and industry" and thus "create 
the poor which they maintain," and Ricardo wrote in 1817 that "whilst 
the present laws are in force, it is quite in the natural order of things that 
the fund for the maintenance of the poor should progressively increase 
till it has absorbed all the net revenue of the country."3 The critics of 
the administration of relief were unable to explain the regional varia-
tions in per capita relief expenditures. The commissioners concluded 
simply that "the abuses of the Poor Laws" were generally confined to 
the South of England. 
Although the Poor Law Commission and most other contemporaries 
placed exclusive blame for increasing relief expenditures on the admin-
istration of relief, Frederick Eden and David Davies, the great social 
investigators of the 1790s, found evidence that the increase in relief 
expenditures was caused, at least in part, by important changes in the 
economic environment. Davies maintained that the real income of 
agricultural laborers had declined since 1750, as a result of "the general 
advance in the prices" of consumer goods, the decline in employment 
for women and children (due mainly to the collapse of cottage industry 
in the South), and the loss of cottage land through enclosures and 
engrossments. The decline in income from these sources forced parish-
es to increase their relief payments to poor workers.4 Eden's parish-
level investigation of The State of the Poor found employment opportu-
nities and wage rates for women and children in cottage industry to be 
declining in several southern parishes. Moreover, Eden and Davies 
presented evidence of a negative correlation between earnings in 
cottage industry and poor relief expenditures.5 
Eden and Davies also believed that granting allotments of land to poor 
laborers would significantly reduce their dependence on poor relief. 
Many others shared this belief. Barnett has determined that 184 
pamphlets proposing allotment schemes were published between 1795 
and 1835.6 The most vocal advocate of allotments was Arthur Young, 
who maintained that "the possession of a cottage and about an acre of 
land, . . . if they do not keep the proprietor in every case from the 
parish, yet [they] very materially lessen the burden [of poor relief] in 
all."7 
3
 T. R. Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (1st ed., 1798; reprint, New York, 
1970), pp. 98, 97; D. Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (1817; reprint, 
London, 1912), p. 61. 
4
 David Davies, The Case of Labourers in Husbandry (Bath, 1795), p. 57. 
5
 Frederic Morton Eden, The State of the Poor, 3 vols. (1797; reprint, London, 1966), vol. 2, pp. 
2, 471, 687; vol. 3: p. 796. Davies, The Case of Labourers, pp. 84-86. 
6
 Eden, State, vol. 1, pp. xx; Davies, The Case of Labourers, pp. 102-3; D. C. Barnett, 
"Allotments and the Problem of Rural Poverty, 1780-1840," in E. L. Jones and G. E. Mingay, 
eds., Land, Labour and Population in the Industrial Revolution (New York, 1968), p. 175. 
7
 Arthur Young, Inquiry into the Propriety of Applying Wastes to the Better Maintenance and 
Support of the Poor (London, 1801), p. 509. On the other hand, Malthus argued that the ready 
availability of allotments "would be incomparably more powerful in encouraging a population 
116 Boyer 
Analysts of the Old Poor Law gave four reasons for the rapid increase 
in relief expenditures from 1780 to 1834. Virtually every analyst claimed 
that the use of outdoor relief caused a reduction in labor supply, and 
hence an increased demand for relief.8 There was also general agree-
ment that relief expenditures increased in response to declining wage 
rates, although there was some debate over the cause of declining 
wages. The Poor Law Commission and most others argued that after the 
adoption of outdoor relief the farmers lowered wages.9 Davies, howev-
er, claimed that the decline in real wages began decades before the 
widespread adoption of outdoor relief. Davies and Eden presented 
evidence that relief expenditures tended to be relatively low in areas 
where women and children were employed in cottage industry. Finally, 
many maintained that parishes where laborers were granted allotments 
of land tended to have relatively low poor rates. 
Karl Polanyi in 1944 was the first person to present an alternative 
theory.10 While he accepted that increased relief expenditures were in 
part due to the loss of land by enclosure and to labor supply disincen-
tives, Polanyi maintained that outdoor relief was a response by the 
countryside to the increased demand for labor in the city. Agriculture 
could not compete with urban wage rates by the late eighteenth century. 
In order to "prevent the draining off of rural labor," parishes adopted 
outdoor relief policies, which raised the income of agricultural laborers 
"without overburdening the farmer." Polanyi saw outdoor relief as part 
of a relatively inexpensive method for farmers to secure "an adequate 
reserve of labor" for peak seasons, because it enabled them to pass 
some of their labor costs onto the "rural middle class." Farmers 
beyond the demand for labor than our present poor-laws." T. R. Malthus, A Letter to Samuel 
Whitbread . . . on His Proposed Bill for the Amendment of the Poor Laws (1807), 2nd ed., 
reprinted in The Pamphlets of Thomas Robert Malthus (New York, 1970), p. 396. 
8
 For example, Eden concluded that the existing system of poor relief was "the parent of 
idleness and improvidence," and thus had "a tendency to increase the number of those wanting 
relief" (State of the Poor, pp. 481, 450). 
9
 Malthus wrote that "it would appear from the different prices of labour in different parishes, 
and the different proportions of population relieved, that the farmers, although they bear 
themselves a large proportion of the assessments, have already learned in some places to prefer low 
wages and high rates, to low rates and high wages" (A Letter, p. 49). 
10
 Two major interpretive studies of the Old Poor Law were published between the 1834 Poor 
Law Report and Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation (New York, 1944)—namely John 
Hammond and Barbara Hammond's The Village Labourer, 1760-1832 (1911; reprint, New York, 
1967), and Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb's English Local Government: English Poor Law 
History: The Old Poor Law (London, 1927). While these two works are extremely important in the 
historiography of the Old Poor Law, they added little to the list of determinants of increased relief 
expenditures. The Hammonds maintained that the rapid increase in relief expenditures at the end of 
the eighteenth century was caused by the enclosure movement, which robbed laborers of their 
land, and by a simultaneous decline in real wage rates (pp. 106, 111). The Webbs' explanation was 
essentially the same (pp. 419-21). Both the Hammonds and the Webbs accepted the traditional 
hypothesis that outdoor relief policies caused "the destruction of all motives for effort and 
ambition" and hence that the continued increase in relief expenditures up to 1834 was due, in part, 
to the manner in which relief was administered (Hammond and Hammond, pp. 225, 231; Webb and 
Webb, pp. 172, 191, 194). 
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preferred outdoor relief to allotments of land because allotments made 
workers too independent. For all this, however, Polanyi ignored the 
evidence of regional variations, maintaining that outdoor relief "became 
the law of the land over most of the countryside."11 
Mark Blaug's 1963 paper, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the 
Making of the New," marked the beginning of a revisionist analysis of 
outdoor relief. Blaug maintained that outdoor relief did not appreciably 
reduce labor supply: the scale at which relief was given was so low that 
it could not have been "an attractive alternative to gainful employ-
ment." Rural parishes adopted outdoor relief policies in the 1790s in 
order to supplement wage rates that were precariously close to subsis-
tence. By repairing "nutritional deficiencies," outdoor relief might in 
fact have increased labor productivity and hence caused an increase in 
wage rates.12 Blaug turned the conventional hypothesis completely on 
its head. 
Blaug provided an explanation for the regional variations in per capita 
relief expenditures. Relief expenditures were relatively high in the 
South and East, first, because seasonality in the demand for agricultural 
labor was especially pronounced in grain production, and the Southeast 
was the major grain-producing region. Second, fixed-income annual 
labor contracts were common in the North, while in the South labor was 
hired by the week or even by the day. Third, southern rural areas 
suffered from "disguised unemployment" caused by the decline of 
cottage industry after 1800 and the "relative immobility of rural 
labor."13 
Most studies of the Old Poor Law published since 1963 have offered 
support for Blaug's conclusion. Taylor and Baugh maintained that since 
rural parishes were "generally small enough to apply any relief system 
with discretion," the disincentive effects of outdoor relief must have 
been small.14 Digby expanded on Blaug's contention that relief expendi-
tures were positively correlated with the extent of seasonality in labor 
demand. She found that labor-hiring farmers dominated parish govern-
ment in rural Norfolk, and that they responded to the seasonal nature of 
grain production by "exploiting their position as poor law administra-
tors to pursue a policy with an economical alteration of poor relief and 
independent income for the labourer."15 
11
 Polanyi, Great Transformation, pp. 94, 297-99, 78. 
12
 Mark Blaug, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the Making of the New," this JOURNAL, 23 
(1963), pp. 151-84, especially 161-62, 154-55. 
13
 Ibid., pp. 170-72. 
14
 J. S. Taylor, "The Mythology of the Old Poor Law," this JOURNAL, 29 (1969), pp. 292-97, 
especially p. 295; Daniel A. Baugh, "The Cost of Poor Relief in South-East England, 1790-1834," 
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 28 (1975), pp. 50-68, especially p. 61. 
15
 Anne Digby, "The Labour Market and the Continuity of Social Policy After 1834: The Case of 
the Eastern Counties," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 28 (1975), pp. 69-83, and Pauper 
Palaces (London, 1978), p. 105. 
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McCloskey disagreed with one aspect of Blaug's analysis. He argued 
that outdoor relief was generally administered as an income subsidy 
"with a 100 percent marginal rate of tax on earned income below the 
minimum," and therefore must have produced serious work disincen-
tives. He went on to note, however, that the reduction in labor supply 
resulting from outdoor relief policies would have led to an increase in 
wage rates, so long as outdoor relief did not shift the demand curve for 
agricultural labor. Thus, McCloskey concluded that the conventional 
hypothesis that outdoor relief reduced both the supply of labor and 
wage rates could not be correct.16 
In a recent paper I have argued, as Polanyi did, that the major 
function of outdoor relief was to provide unemployment benefits for 
seasonally unemployed agricultural laborers. During the last two or 
three decades of the eighteenth century the decline of cottage industry, 
and the loss of land from enclosure and engrossment, created a class of 
rural laborers whose only source of income was wage labor in agricul-
ture. In order to maintain the laborer's income at a subsistence level, 
farmers anxious to secure an adequate peak season labor force had to 
either raise agricultural wage rates or agree to grant poor relief to 
workers not needed during the winter months.17 I argue, following 
Digby, that labor-hiring farmers were able to make this choice because 
they dominated the administrative affairs of the parishes. 
I developed a simple model to compare alternative labor contracts. 
Labor-hiring farmers chose the wage rate, the slack season employment 
levels, and the weekly relief benefits for unemployed workers so as to 
maximize their profits subject to the constraint that any contract offered 
to workers had to yield an expected utility large enough to keep them 
from migrating to urban industrial areas. Contracts containing outdoor 
relief and layoffs dominated alternative contracts in areas where the 
demand for labor fluctuated sharply over the crop cycle; year-long wage 
contracts, by contrast, dominated in areas where the demand for labor 
remained steady throughout the year.18 Per capita relief expenditures 
would therefore be higher in grain-producing areas than in pasture 
farming areas, as they actually were. Moreover, the value of the 
compensation package, in terms of utility, that labor-hiring farmers had 
to offer in order to retain their workers was found to be negatively 
related to the cost of migrating from the parish to an urban industrial 
area. Assuming that cost of migration can be proxied by distance, wage 
rates or relief expenditures would have been lower the further a parish 
was from an urban labor market. 
Employment opportunities for women and children in cottage indus-
16
 Donald McCloskey, "New Perspectives on the Old Poor Law," Explorations in Economic 
History, 10 (1973), pp. 419-36, especially p. 427. 
17
 G. R. Boyer, "An Economic Role of the English Poor Law circa 1780-1834," Explorations in 
Economic History, 22 (1985), pp. 129-67, especially pp. 154-56. 
18
 Ibid., pp. 156-60. 
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try, or allotments of land, reduced the value of the implicit contract that 
farmers had to offer their workers. In response, poor relief expenditures 
might have declined, as Davies, Eden, and Young maintained. Yet 
farmers might have responded to such advantages by cutting wage rates 
for adult males. The small size of rural parishes suggests that it should 
not have been difficult for farmers to agree to do so.19 
Of course, the extent to which farmers were able to respond to the 
existence of allotments or cottage industry by cutting wages rather than 
relief expenditures depended on the extent of their political power. 
Because this varied across parishes, there is no reason to believe that all 
parishes reacted in the same way to, say, the existence of cottage 
industry. Rather, I predict that labor-hiring farmers were more likely to 
reduce wage rates the more dominant they were in parish politics. 
This summary of the literature on the economic role of the Old Poor 
Law has revealed several hypotheses concerning the causes of the rapid 
increase in relief expenditures from 1780 to 1834, and of regional 
variations in relief expenditures. Unfortunately the lack of time-series 
data makes it impossible to directly test the hypotheses concerning the 
long-term increase in relief expenditures. Most of the hypotheses can be 
tested indirectly, however, by a cross-sectional regression to explain 
variations in relief expenditures across parishes. For instance, if per 
capita relief expenditures were indeed negatively correlated with em-
ployment opportunities for women and children in cottage industry, it 
should be the case that at any point in time parishes with employment 
opportunities in cottage industry had lower per capita relief expendi-
tures than parishes without cottage industry, other things equal. The 
hypotheses suggest that a single equation model would be inadequate to 
explain cross-parish variations in relief expenditures. Wage rates and 
unemployment rates determined relief expenditures, but relief expendi-
tures lowered wage rates and increased unemployment rates. 
I I . DATA 
The major data source used is the returns to the Rural Queries, an 
"elaborate" questionnaire distributed among rural parishes in the 
summer of 1832 by the Royal Poor Law Commission, and printed as 
Appendix B of the 1834 Poor Law Report.20 The Rural Queries 
19
 For the sample of southern agricultural parishes used in the empirical analysis here, the 
average number of labor-hiring farmers per parish was 16 in 1831. There is no reason to believe that 
farmers would not have been eager to form a cartel to reduce wages rather than relief expenditures, 
since the method for financing poor relief ensured that all labor-hiring farmers would benefit from 
such a policy. Note that I am assuming that workers made decisions concerning migration based on 
their total compensation package rather than simply on their wage income in agriculture. In other 
words, I claim that it was not necessary to pay workers their marginal product in wages. It follows 
that a worker receiving poor relief should be indifferent between a reduction in wage income or in 
relief benefits. 
20
 Parliamentary Papers, Report From His Majesty's Commissioners for Inquiry into the 
Administration and Practical Operation of the Poor Laws. Appendix Bl, Answers to Rural Queries 
(1834), vols. 30-34. 
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contained 58 questions relating to the administration of poor relief, wage 
rates and employment opportunities for adult males, females, and 
children, seasonal levels of unemployment, the existence of cottage 
gardens and allotments for laborers, and the productivity of the labor 
force. It is not clear how many parishes received the questionnaire, but 
approximately 1,100 responses were returned, about 10 percent of the 
rural parishes in England. 
The returns have never been fully utilized. Historians of the Old Poor 
Law have used them almost exclusively as a source of critical comment 
from local officials concerning the bad effects of outdoor relief. The 
reason for the neglect is the "unmanageable nature" of the data, which 
filled five folio volumes of Parliamentary Papers, each about a thousand 
pages in length. The Poor Law Commission itself was overwhelmed by 
the returns. The first and only attempt to analyze the returns was 
Blaug's, which tabulated at the county level the answers to questions 
dealing with various policies.21 Though providing important information 
concerning differences in the administration of outdoor relief across 
counties, the tabulation does not pretend to be a thorough statistical 
analysis. 
I drew a sample of 329 parishes from the 21 counties lying south of a 
line between the Severn and the Wash.22 Outdoor relief was used most 
extensively in the South, and the Poor Law Commission and most 
historians have focused their analyses on southern counties. And there 
are reasons to believe that the responses of many northern parishes are 
not reliable. The Rural Queries were drawn up with southern agricultur-
al parishes in mind, though mailed to parishes throughout England. 
Many of the northern parishes that responded were close to industrial 
cities and contained large numbers of handloom weavers and other 
nonagricultural laborers. They appear to have responded to questions 
concerning agricultural laborers with information on the poorest labor-
ers in their parish, generally handloom weavers. 
There are several problems associated with using the returns. First, 
the poor wording of some of the questions led to vague and sometimes 
uninterpretable responses. This is especially unfortunate in the case of 
Question 23, which asks: "What number of individuals received relief 
last week, not being in the workhouse?" Parishes answered this 
question in several ways. In rare cases the answer is stated in the form: 
"We have X number of men, women, and children on relief." The usual 
response simply states the number of recipients, without stating explic-
itly what the number entails. It is not possible to tell whether the answer 
21
 Mark Blaug, "The Poor Law Report Reexamined," this JOURNAL, 24 (1964), pp. 229-45. 
22
 The sample of 329 parishes was chosen from the 735 responses to the Rural Queries by 
southern parishes, on the basis of the completeness of their returns. All parishes that responded to 
each of a selected subset of questions deemed necessary for the statistical analysis were included in 
the sample. 
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relates to the number of able-bodied heads of households on relief, the 
number of able-bodied heads and their wives and children, or the 
number of able-bodied heads, widows, old people, and infirm receiving 
outdoor relief. Equally seriously, because the parishes returned the 
Queries over a four-month period, from September 1832 to January 
1833, it is never clear when in the seasonal cycle the parish responded. 
The only reliable measure of relief expenditures available at the parish 
level is expenditures per capita. Although the variable fails to distin-
guish between incidence and generosity it has been used by virtually all 
students of the matter as a proxy for either or both. 
The vagueness of parish responses to other questions made it possible 
to categorize their answers only as "yes" or "no." For instance, 
Question 20 asked: "Whether any land let to labourers; if so, the 
quantity to each, and at what rent?" A large number of parishes 
responded that laborers rented allotments but did not give the size of the 
allotments, the rent paid, or the size of the parish rent subsidy, if any. It 
was therefore possible only to determine the presence or absence of 
rented allotments. Similar responses were obtained from questions 
dealing with the use of allowances in aid of wages, child allowances, 
labor rates, and roundsmen systems, and the existence of cottage 
industry. The information from such questions could be introduced into 
the regression analysis only in the form of yes/no variables. 
It was necessary to construct estimates of annual earnings when 
parishes reported wages but not earnings. For each county the relation-
ship between wage rates and annual earnings was determined for 
parishes that returned both. This information was then used to estimate 
annual earnings in those parishes that reported only wage rates. A 
detailed description of how the earnings estimates were constructed is 
given in the Appendix. 
The other major source of data was the 1831 Census, in particular the 
occupational enumeration.23 The Census reported the number of males 
20 years of age and older for each parish, and the number belonging to 
each of nine occupational categories. I used five of the categories in 
constructing variables: farmers employing laborers, farmers not em-
ploying laborers (that is, family farmers), laborers employed in agricul-
ture, persons employed in handicrafts and retail trade, and nonagricul-
tural laborers. These data were used to estimate unemployment rates, 
specialization in agriculture, and the proportion of parish taxpayers who 
were labor-hiring farmers. 
County averages for some of the variables included in the regression 
analysis are given in Table 1. The extent of cottage industry and 
allotments varied enormously across counties. Cottage industry was 
prominent in the midland counties of Bedford, Buckingham, Northamp-
Parliamentary Papers, Census of 1831, Enumeration Abstract (1833). 
TABLE 1 
COUNTY AVERAGES: SELECTED VARIABLES 
Sussex 
Buckingham 
Suffolk 
Essex 
Bedford 
Oxford 
Northampton 
Wiltshire 
Berkshire 
Norfolk 
Huntingdon 
Kent 
Southampton 
Cambridge 
Hertford 
Dorset 
Surrey 
Devon 
Somerset 
Gloucester 
Cornwall 
Per Capita 
Relief 
Expenditures, 
1831 (s.,d.) 
19.4 
18.7 
18.4 
17.2 
16.11 
16.11 
16.10 
16.9 
15.9 
15.4 
15.3 
14.5 
13.10 
13.8 
13.2 
11.5 
10.11 
9.0 
8.10 
8.8 
6.8 
Average 
Annual 
Unemployment 
Rate 
9.6% 
8.3 
10.3 
6.4 
10.8 
20.9 
11.3 
10.5 
5.6 
2.6 
4.7 
6.8 
7.2 
7.7 
4.8 
5.4 
6.3 
4.9 
3.8 
4.8 
3.0 
Average 
Summer 
Unemployment 
Rate 
4.8% 
4.6 
8.0 
4.3 
7.1 
13.3 
7.5 
4.3 
3.0 
1.3 
1.6 
3.2 
4.2 
4.2 
1.2 
0.0 
3.0 
2.6 
3.7 
2.9 
1.2 
Average 
Winter 
Unemployment 
Rate 
13.8% 
11.0 
11.9 
8.2 
13.9 
25.2 
14.5 
15.9 
8.1 
3.8 
7.7 
9.6 
10.0 
11.0 
8.3 
10.9 
9.0 
6.4 
3.8 
6.4 
4.7 
Agricultural Laborers 
Reported 
Annual 
Income 
31.78 
29.39 
28.99 
28.29 
28.60 
27.75 
28.14 
24.86 
28.92 
31.07 
30.81 
34.61 
29.04 
28.36 
29.82 
25.40 
33.56 
24.55 
21.27 
24.32 
22.88 
Expected 
Annual 
Income 
28.73 
26.95 
26.00 
26.48 
25.50 
21.95 
24.96 
22.25 
27.30 
30.26 
29.36 
32.26 
26.95 
26.18 
28.39 
24.03 
31.45 
23.35 
20.70 
23.15 
22.19 
Percent of Parishes 
With 
Cottage 
Industry 
1.2% 
71.4 
5.9 
22.4 
100.0 
44.8 
83.3 
20.7 
12.5 
12.5 
15.4 
0.0 
6.9 
2.3 
50.0 
62.5 
13.8 
20.8 
44.0 
22.2 
16.7 
Granting 
Allotments 
38.1% 
19.2 
32.5 
25.0 
80.0 
68.4 
46.7 
83.3 
40.7 
38.7 
30.0 
31.0 
65.2 
56.3 
25.0 
100.0 
21.1 
70.6 
68.4 
57.1 
60.0 
Percent of 
Agricultural 
Land in Grain 
Production 
36.0 
35.2 
52.3 
51.4 
46.7 
40.6 
34.9 
33.9 
42.2 
44.5 
49.1 
36.0 
40.7 
56.7 
45.4 
28.5 
35.7 
29.5 
19.2 
28.6 
31.3 
to 
o 
-1 
Source: Per capita relief expenditures, 1831 from Blaug, "The Myth of the Old Poor Law and the Making of the New," this JOURNAL, 23 (1963), pp. 178-79. Percent 
of agricultural land in grain production from Parliamentary Papers, Returns Relating to the Acreage of Land Under Crops, 1866, vol. 60. All others calculated by au-
thor from Parliamentary Papers, Answers to Rural Queries, 1834, vols. 30-31. 
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ton, and Oxford, and almost nonexistent in Kent, Sussex, and much of 
East Anglia. Allotments were abundant in the Southwest, and scarce in 
areas close to London. Unemployment rates, as one would expect, 
were high in many (but not all) grain-producing counties and low in the 
pasture-farming Southwest. Winter unemployment rates tended to be 
significantly higher than summer unemployment rates. Both per capita 
relief expenditures and the annual earnings of agricultural laborers 
declined as one moved further from London; the labor market in 
southern England was well integrated by 1832. 
III. ESTIMATION OF THE THREE-EQUATION MODEL 
The model to be estimated consists of three equations, to explain 
cross-parish variations in per capita relief expenditures, annual income 
of agricultural laborers, and annual unemployment rates. Two specifica-
tions of the model are estimated. The first is a three-equation reduced 
form. The specification of a reduced form model is based on the 
supposition that labor-hiring farmers dominated local parish politics, 
and thus were able to choose relief expenditures, wage income, and the 
level of unemployment to maximize profits. Estimates obtained from 
the reduced form yield predictions of how economic and demographic 
conditions affected farmers' choices. 
The model regresses relief per capita, laborers' annual wage income, 
and annual unemployment on all the allegedly exogenous variables, 
Industry through Wealth, in Table 2. The expected impact of each 
exogenous variable is given in column 1 of Table 3. 
The reduced form model does not test the hypothesis of contempo-
rary observers that the long-term increase in per capita relief expendi-
tures was a result of interactions among relief expenditures, wage rates, 
layoffs, and voluntary unemployment. Ideally, a three-equation simulta-
neous system should be estimated, in which wage income and the 
unemployment rate are assumed to be determinants of per capita relief 
expenditures, but also to be determined in part by the level of relief 
expenditures. Unfortunately, because per capita relief expenditure is in 
fact generosity of relief times incidence, and incidence of relief is 
obviously correlated with the unemployment rate, it is not possible to 
determine the effect of relief generosity on unemployment. Per capita 
relief expenditures could have a positive impact on the rate of unem-
ployment even if generosity of relief had no effect on unemployment. 
The hypothesis that relief expenditures and laborers' wage income 
were interrelated was tested by estimating the determinants of relief and 
wage income as a simultaneous system. The specific form of the model 
is: 
Relief = bQ + bx Industry + b2 Allotments + b3 London + b4 Farmers 
+ b5 Wealth + b6 Workhouse + b7 Unemployment 
+ b$ Income (1) 
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TABLE 2 
THE PARISH VARIABLES FROM THE 1832 SURVEY 
Relief per capita relief expenditures of parish 
Income expected annual income of adult male agricultural laborers 
Unemployment annual unemployment rate 
Industry dummy variable equal to 1 if cottage industry exists in the parish 
Allotments dummy variable equal to 1 if laborers have allotments of farm land 
London distance from London 
Farmers ratio of labor-hiring farmers to total number of parish taxpayers 
Workhouse dummy variable equal to 1 if parish has a workhouse 
Childallow dummy variable equal to 1 if parish pays children allowances 
Subsidy dummy variable equal to 1 if parish subsidizes wage rates of privately em-
ployed laborers 
Rate dummy variable equal to 1 if parish uses a labor rate 
Roundsmen dummy variable equal to 1 if parish uses a roundsmen system 
Grain estimated percent of parish's adult males employed in grain production 
Density density of population in parish 
Wealth per capita value of real property in parish 
Source: See Appendix. 
Income - a0 + a\ Industry + a2 Allotments + a3 London 
+ a4 Childallow + a5 Subsidy + a6 Rate + a7 Roundsmen 
+ a$ Density + a9 Relief (2) 
The expected impact of each explanatory variable is given in Table 4. 
The reasoning behind the expectations given in Tables 3 and 4 should 
be briefly noted. Per capita relief expenditures are expected to be 
determined, first of all, by the existence and magnitude of alternative 
income sources, namely employment opportunities in cottage industry, 
TABLE 3 
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL IMPACT OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES: REDUCED 
FORM MODEL SUMMARY TABLE 
Industry 
Allotments 
London 
Farmers 
Density 
Childallow 
Subsidy 
Workhouse 
Roundsmen 
Rate 
Grain 
Wealth 
Dependent Variable 
Per Capita Relief 
Expenditures 
Expected 
-
-
-
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
? 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Actual 
0 
0 
-
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
Dependent Variable 
Annual Male 
Income 
Expected 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7 
-
-
-
+ 
Actual 
-
-
-
0 
-
-
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Dependent Variable 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Expected 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
-
9 
-
+ 
-
Actual 
0 
+ 
-
+ 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
f 
-
Source: See text. 
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TABLE 4 
EXPECTED AND ACTUAL IMPACT OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES: 
SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODEL SUMMARY TABLE 
Dependent Variable Per Dependent Variable Annual 
Capita Relief Expenditures Male Income 
Expected Actual Expected Actual 
Industry 
Allotments 
London 
Farmers 
Density 
Childallow 
Subsidy 
Workhouse 
Roundsmen 
Rate 
Grain 
Wealth 
Unemployment 
Income 
Relief 
Source: See text. 
-
-
-
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
0 
0 
0 
+ 
+ 
-
the existence of allotments, and the expected wage income of agricultur-
al laborers. Distance from London is a proxy for cost of migration.24 As 
the cost of migration increased, the cost of securing an adequate peak 
season labor force declined, which should have caused a reduction in 
relief expenditures.25 The variable Farmers tests whether, as the 
24
 By using distance from London as a proxy for the cost of migration, I am assuming that 
London was the destination for all potential migrants from the agricultural South. The assumption 
may be incorrect for rural areas close to other southern cities. During the period 1801-1831, the 
combined populations of Bath, Brighton, Bristol, Norwich, Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Southamp-
ton increased by 174,000. However, over the same period, the population of London increased by 
790,000 (B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics [Cambridge, 1962], 
pp. 19, 24-27). Deane and Cole found that all southern counties outside the London area 
experienced net out-migration from 1801 to 1831, while London experienced heavy in-migration (P. 
Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth, 1688-1959 [2nd ed., Cambridge, 1967], p. 115). 
Thus, the attraction of, say, Bristol was not strong enough to keep Gloucester from losing workers 
to London. Moreover, Redford, Pollard, and Hunt agree that there was very little migration from 
the rural South to the industrial cities of the Northwest during this period. This suggests that 
London was indeed the major destination of southern migrants. Hunt concludes that "a large part 
of the southern labor force appears to have operated in a particularly restricted market. They 
moved overwhelmingly in one direction—towards London" (E. H. Hunt, Regional Wage 
Variations in Britain 1850-1914 [Oxford, 1973], pp. 281-84). See also Arthur Redford, Labour 
Migration in England, 1800-1850 (2nd ed., New York, 1968); Sidney Pollard, "Labour in Great 
Britain," in Peter Mathias and M. M. Postan, eds., Cambridge Economic History of Europe, 
(Cambridge, 1978), vol. 7, part 1. 
25
 A negative correlation between distance from London and relief expenditures or wage income 
might be explained by regional differences in the cost of living rather than by my hypothesized cost-
of-migration effect. In other words, real wage income and per capita relief expenditures might not 
have varied inversely with distance from London even though nominal wage income and relief 
expenditures did. Unfortunately, there is little available data with which to test this hypothesis. 
The only attempt to measure regional variations in the cost of living has been by N.F.R. Crafts for 
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political power of labor-hiring farmers (estimated by the ratio of labor-
hiring farmers to total taxpayers) increased, they were able to pass more 
of the cost of maintaining their workers on to the parish. A parish's per 
capita property wealth might be a determinant of its relief generosity, 
and thus is expected to have a positive impact on relief expenditures. 
The variable Grain is a proxy for seasonality in the demand for labor. 
An increase in seasonality should have increased the winter unemploy-
ment rate and, therefore, per capita relief expenditures. The rate of 
unemployment is included as an explanatory variable in the simulta-
neous equations model, and Grain is omitted.26 Finally, Workhouse is 
included to test the contention, often heard before Parliamentary 
committees, that indoor relief was more expensive than outdoor relief.27 
Equation (2) tests the extent to which alternative sources of income, 
various forms of outdoor relief, distance from urban labor markets, and 
surplus labor affected expected annual income. The variables Industry 
and Allotments were included to determine whether labor-hiring farm-
ers responded to the existence of alternative (non-relief) sources of 
family income by reducing wage rates. Per capita relief expenditure was 
included in the simultaneous equations model to test whether poor relief 
was a substitute for wage income. The cost-of-migration hypothesis 
suggests that wage income should be negatively related to distance from 
London. Population density is a crude proxy for the relative tightness of 
the labor market, and thus is expected to be negatively related to wage 
income. 
The remaining four variables represent specific forms of outdoor 
relief, each of which is expected to have a negative impact on wage 
income. The existence of child allowances for laborers with large 
families should have enabled farmers to reduce their wage payments to 
a level just high enough to support a family of three or four. Payment of 
wages "out of the rates," labor rates, and roundsmen systems all 
the year 1843. He found that although the cost of living was indeed higher in London than in the 
rural South, there was no evidence of an inverse relationship between cost of living and distance 
from London. One can question this result, since Crafts assumes that rural rents were equal 
throughout England (see N.F.R. Crafts, ''Regional Price Variations in England in 1843: An Aspect 
of the Standard-of-Living Debate," Explorations in Economic History, 19 (1982), pp. 51-70, 
especially pp. 62, 61). However, this assumption is supported by evidence cited in Hunt (Regional 
Wage Variations, pp. 79-80). In order to take account of the regional cost-of-living differences 
found by Crafts, I deflated nominal wage income and per capita relief expenditures using his 
indices. 
26
 Grain is omitted because it should affect relief expenditures only through its impact on the 
unemployment rate. 
27
 Of course, the recipients of poor relief included widows and old, sick, or infirm persons as well 
as able-bodied laborers and their families. Thus, cross-parish variations in per capita relief 
expenditures could be caused in part by differences in the proportion of widows and so forth in the 
parishes' populations. Unfortunately, lack of data made it impossible to control for such 
differences. 
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involved parish subsidization of farmers who employed laborers, and 
thus should have caused market wage rates to decline.28 
A parish's unemployment rate should be determined by its crop mix, 
the relative tightness of its local labor market, its relief policies, and the 
availability of alternative income sources. The more a parish specialized 
in the production of grain the higher its unemployment rate should have 
been, because of the highly seasonal nature of labor requirements in 
grain production. Density is expected to have a positive impact on 
unemployment. 
The existence of a workhouse enabled parishes to threaten unem-
ployed workers with indoor relief, and thus should have reduced 
voluntary (and total) unemployment. Payment of allowances-in-aid-of-
wages (the so-called Speenhamland system) might have created serious 
work disincentive effects; the variable Subsidy tests whether Speen-
hamland policies caused an increase in the rate of unemployment. The 
political power of labor-hiring farmers is expected to have a positive 
impact on seasonal layoffs and thus on the unemployment rate. The 
existence of alternative income sources in the form of cottage industry 
and allotments might have increased the willingness of farmers to lay off 
workers during slack seasons.29 Both labor rates and roundsmen 
systems reduced the cost of employing workers during the winter 
months, and therefore should have a negative impact on unemployment 
rates. But the administration of roundsmen systems often encouraged 
farmers to increase layoffs in order to rehire the same workers at 
reduced wage costs. By some definitions of unemployment in the Rural 
Queries the unemployment rates might have increased under the 
roundsmen system. 
IV. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The results are given in Tables 5 and 6 and summarized in Tables 3 
and 4. The existence of cottage industry and allotments had an impact 
28
 The payment of poor relief to privately employed laborers occurred under the allowance 
system, which guaranteed laborers (whether employed or unemployed) a minimum weeky income, 
determined by their family size and the price of bread. The roundsmen system and the labor rate 
were methods for dealing with seasonal unemployment. Under the roundsmen system, seasonally 
unemployed laborers were offered to farmers at reduced wage rates, with the parish making up the 
difference between the laborers' wage income and subsistence. Under the labor rate, the parish's 
total wage bill for the slack season was computed, and divided among the rate-payers according to 
their poor rate assessment. A rate-payer could pay his share either by hiring laborers at the wage 
rate set by the parish or by paying the amount to the parish as a poor rate. For more details on these 
methods of outdoor relief, see McCloskey, "New Perspectives," pp. 430-36; and G. R. Boyer, 
"The Economic Role of the English Poor Law circa 1780-1834" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Wisconsin, 1982), pp. 34-56. 
29
 Alternatively, agricultural laborers might have voluntarily reduced their labor supply in 
response to the existence of cottage industry or allotments. See footnote 31. 
to 
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TABLE 5 
REGRESSION RESULTS: REDUCED FORM MODEL 
Dependent Variable Per Capita Relief 
Expenditures Dependent Variable Annual Male Income Dependent Variable Unemployment Rate 
Constant 
Industry 
Allotments 
London 
Farmers 
Wealth 
Density 
Childallow 
Subsidy 
Grain 
Workhouse 
Roundsmen 
Rate 
R2 
N 
P 
11.33 
-1.40 
-0.16 
-0.04 
5.18 
-0.30 
-0.49 
5.18 
0.33 
0.21 
1.23 
1.14 
0.31 
0.297 
329 
f-Statistic 
5.17 
1.52 
0.21 
4.17 
2.42 
1.64 
0.99 
5.10 
0.34 
3.46 
1.44 
0.95 
0.93 
Prob > in 
0.0001 
0.130 
0.833 
0.0001 
0.016 
0.102 
0.322 
0.0001 
0.735 
0.001 
0.151 
0.342 
0.355 
a 
35.45 
-2.58 
-0.90 
-0.06 
2.08 
0.05 
-0.60 
-1.28 
-0.46 
-0.05 
0.77 
0.41 
0.11 
0.343 
329 
f-Statistic 
26.44 
4.58 
1.91 
9.70 
1.58 
0.47 
1.98 
2.06 
0.76 
1.31 
1.48 
0.57 
0.55 
Prob > III 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.056 
0.0001 
0.114 
0.640 
0.049 
0.040 
0.445 
0.192 
0.139 
0.571 
0.582 
y 
0.98 
1.13 
2.06 
-0.02 
4.04 
-0.47 
0.41 
2.55 
1.56 
0.19 
0.92 
2.18 
0.06 
0.151 
329 
r-Statistic 
0.43 
1.18 
2.58 
1.77 
1.82 
2.52 
0.79 
2.43 
1.54 
2.98 
1.04 
1.77 
0.18 
Prob > 
0.664 
0.238 
0.010 
0.078 
0.069 
0.012 
0.428 
0.016 
0.124 
0.003 
0.299 
0.078 
0.854 
Source: See text. 
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TABLE 6 
REGRESSION RESULTS: SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS MODEL 
Constant 
Industry 
Allotments 
London 
Farmers 
Wealth 
Density 
Childallow 
Subsidy 
Workhouse 
Roundsmen 
Rate 
Unemployment 
Income 
Relief 
Dependent Variable Per Capita 
b 
37.28 
-3.62 
-1.18 
-0.09 
8.86 
-0.01 
0.92 
0.33 
-0.61 
Relief Expenditures 
r-Statistic 
1.69 
2.03 
1.27 
2.24 
3.32 
0.08 
0.87 
3.40 
0.94 
Prob > iri 
0.093 
0.043 
0.204 
0.026 
0.001 
0.938 
0.387 
0.001 
0.350 
Dependent Variable Annual Male 
a 
38.82 
-2.96 
-0.98 
-0.07 
-0.82 
-0.30 
-0.36 
0.77 
0.16 
-0.17 
Income 
r-Statistic 
24.12 
4.98 
2.01 
9.44 
2.61 
0.38 
0.58 
1.02 
0.74 
2.18 
Prob > in 
0.0001 
0.0001 
0.046 
0.0001 
0.010 
0.703 
0.562 
0.311 
0.461 
0.030 
Source: See text. 
on agricultural labor markets, though not necessarily the impact predict-
ed by Eden and Davies. Employment opportunities for women and 
children in cottage industry did indeed cause a reduction in relief 
expenditures in the simultaneous equations model, but not in the 
reduced form. Allotments did not have an impact on relief expenditures 
in either model.30 On the other hand, agricultural laborers' annual wage 
income was reduced by the existence of these alternative sources of 
income in both models. On average, laborers' annual income was £2.5 
to £3.0 lower in parishes with employment opportunities in cottage 
industry than in parishes without cottage industry. The existence of 
allotments caused a reduction of £0.9 to £1.0 in laborers' income, other 
things equal. Unemployment rates were higher in parishes with allot-
ments, suggesting that farmers increased their use of layoffs where 
laborers' families had other sources of income.31 Together these results 
30
 One possible reason for this result is that the average allotment was simply too small to have a 
noticeable impact on relief expenditures. This hypothesis is supported by the responses to question 
20 of the Rural Queries. In over 80 percent of the parishes in which laborers rented allotments, the 
typical allotment size was smaller than a quarter acre, the minimum size recommended by most 
contemporary proponents of allotment schemes. See Barnett, "Allotments," p. 175. 
31
 As mentioned above, there is another possible interpretation for the positive impact of cottage 
industry and allotments on the unemployment rate. Alternative sources of income might have 
caused agricultural laborers to voluntarily reduce their labor supply. We can distinguish between 
these two hypotheses by determining the effect of cottage industry and allotments on weekly wage 
rates. A reduction in labor supply in response to other sources of income should have caused 
agricultural wage rates to increase. However, estimation of both models using agricultural laborers' 
summer wage rates instead of annual earnings yields the opposite result; weekly wage rates were 
lower in parishes containing cottage industry and allotments, other things equal. This result 
supports my hypothesis that labor-hiring farmers increased seasonal layoffs in response to 
alternative sources of income for laborers' families. 
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offer strong support for the hypothesis that politically dominant farmers 
made use of cottage industry and allotments to reduce their wage bill. 
Distance from London had a negative impact on agricultural laborers' 
earnings and on per capita relief expenditures in both models. A 10 
percent increase in distance from London resulted in a 3.2 percent 
reduction in relief expenditures and a 1.5 percent reduction in wage 
income. Specialization in grain had a positive impact on both the rate of 
unemployment and per capita relief expenditure in the reduced form 
model. Moreover, the elasticities associated with specialization in grain 
are quite large. A 10 percent increase in the proportion of land devoted 
to grain implied a 5.1 percent increase in the unemployment rate and a 
2.4 percent increase in relief expenditures. In the simultaneous equa-
tions model the elasticity of relief expenditures with respect to the 
unemployment rate is .14. The provision of unemployment insurance 
was indeed a major purpose of outdoor relief and the unemployment 
rate was determined, in part, by crop mix. 
Per capita relief expenditures and the rate of unemployment were 
affected by the political power of labor-hiring farmers. A 10 percent 
increase in the proportion of parish taxpayers who were labor-hiring 
farmers resulted in a 2 percent increase in the unemployment rate, and a 
1.8 percent increase in per capita relief expenditures. It would appear 
that labor-hiring farmers did indeed use their political power to increase 
their subsidization by other local taxpayers. 
Evidence on the notion that relief expenditures and agricultural 
laborers' wage income were interrelated is mixed. Per capita relief 
expenditures had a negative impact on laborers' annual earnings, but 
the effect was quantitatively small. A 10 percent increase in relief 
expenditures resulted in a 1.0 percent decrease in annual earnings. The 
existence of child allowances had a significant negative impact on 
laborers' earnings in the reduced form model.32 On average, agricultural 
laborers in parishes granting child allowances received an annual wage 
income £1.2 below that of laborers in parishes without child allowances.33 
The above results suggest that, to some extent, the Poor Laws did 
indeed "create the poor which they maintain." On the other hand, the 
annual earnings of agricultural laborers had no impact on per capita 
relief expenditures. Thus, the widely accepted hypothesis that outdoor 
relief was used to supplement "substandard" wage income is not 
supported by the data. 
32
 Child allowances also had a significant positive impact on per capita relief expenditures in the 
reduced form model. Parishes that granted relief to laborers "on account of their families" spent on 
average 5.2s. more per capita on relief than parishes without child allowances, other things equal. 
The mean level of per capita relief expenditures for the sample was 18.1s. 
33
 The mean expected annual income for our sample of parishes was £29.7. None of the other 
three specific forms of outdoor relief (namely, the payment of wages out of the rates, roundsman 
system, labor rate) had a significant impact on either wage income or per capita relief expenditures. 
The Old Poor Law in Southern England 131 
Finally, there is little support for the hypothesis that outdoor relief 
caused an increase in voluntary unemployment. The payment of allow-
ances-in-aid-of-wages had a positive impact on the unemployment rate, 
but its coefficient was not significantly different from zero at the 10 
percent confidence level. The existence of workhouses had a positive, 
though insignificant, impact on unemployment. Thus, while it was not 
possible to directly estimate the effect of relief generosity on unemploy-
ment, the above results provide tentative support for the revisionist 
hypothesis that rural parishes were selective in their granting of relief to 
able-bodied laborers. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LONG-TERM INCREASE IN RELIEF 
EXPENDITURES 
The evidence offers little support for the Royal Poor Law Commis-
sion's hypothesis that regional variations in per capita relief expendi-
tures were caused simply by "the abuses of the Poor Laws" by parishes 
in southeastern England. Conversely, several revisionist hypotheses are 
confirmed. Crop mix, income from cottage industry, and the political 
power of labor-hiring farmers were all important determinants of per 
capita relief expenditures. Surprisingly, the hypothesis that poor relief 
was used to supplement "substandard" wages was not supported by the 
data. Arthur Young's observation that agricultural wage rates varied 
inversely with distance from London was found to hold. Per capita relief 
expenditures also varied inversely with distance from London. Togeth-
er, the results support my hypothesis that farmers anxious to secure an 
adequate peak season labor force were able to reduce the utility value of 
their workers' implicit labor contracts as the cost of migration to 
London increased. 
What insights do the above results yield concerning the rapid increase 
in per capita relief expenditures after 1750? For one thing, they enable 
us to reject the contemporary notion that the increase in relief expendi-
tures was caused almost exclusively by the lax administration of 
outdoor relief, and its effects on wage rates, laborers' productivity, and 
voluntary unemployment. The results also appear to reject the notion 
that relief expenditures increased in response to a sharp decline in 
laborers' landholdings. But the insignificant impact of allotments on 
relief expenditures in the cross-sectional regressions might simply be 
evidence that the average size of allotments in 1832 was small. Unfortu-
nately there is no way to determine the extent to which laborers' 
allotments declined in size after 1760. 
On the positive side, the regression results offer support for several 
new arguments and suggest promising lines of inquiry. Long-term 
changes in crop mix, employment opportunities or wage rates in cottage 
industry, the local political power of labor-hiring farmers, urban wage 
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rates, or cost of migration to London could have caused relief expendi-
tures to increase. 
Parishes in the Southeast of England responded to the long-term rise 
in grain prices from 1760 to 1815 by increasing their specialization in 
grain production.34 Because of the highly seasonal labor demands of 
grain production, the change in crop mix must have exacerbated the 
problem of seasonal unemployment. Snell found that the seasonal 
distribution of male unemployment became more pronounced over the 
period.35 
Employment opportunities for women and children in cottage indus-
try declined throughout most of southern England during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.36 Results of the cross-
sectional regressions show that per capita relief expenditures were 
reduced by up to 20 percent by the existence of cottage industry. 
However, the coefficient for Industry obtained from the 1832 regression 
understates the impact of the decline in cottage industry on the long-
term increase in relief expenditures, because wage rates in cottage 
industry were lower in 1832 than in the late eighteenth century.37 The 
results suggest that the long-term decline in employment opportunities 
and wage rates in cottage industry reduced the annual income of many 
rural families by enough to force them to apply for poor relief in order to 
subsist. 
The power of farmers increased in southern parishes after 1760 as a 
result of changes in the economic and legal environment. The "long-
term . . . consolidation of farms into larger and more efficient units" 
that had begun in the seventeenth century was encouraged by the wave 
of enclosures between 1760 and 1815.38 The decline in the number of 
smallholders increased the power of labor-hiring farmers. The passage 
of Gilbert's Act (1782) introduced "the principle of weighting the right 
to vote according to the amount of property occupied." The principle 
was extended by the 1818 Parish Vestry Act, which allowed rate-payers 
up to six votes in vestry, depending on their poor rate assessment.39 
Because farmers were generally the largest property holders in rural 
parishes their political power was significantly increased in parishes that 
** K. D. M. Snell, "Agricultural Seasonal Unemployment, the Standard of Living, and Women's 
Work in the South and East, 1690-1860," Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 34 (1981), pp. 407-
37. 
35
 Ibid., p. 411. 
36
 Boyer, "An Economic Model," pp. 140-42. 
37
 Evidence that wage rates in cottage industry had been declining for some time prior to 1832 
can be found throughout the Rural Queries (Parliamentary Papers, 1834, vol. 30, pp. 7, 31, 41, 178, 
217, 226, 332, 334, 340, 369, 372, 409, 582). For a discussion of the long-term decline in wage rates 
and employment opportunities, see Ivy Pinchbeck, Women Workers and the Industrial Revolution, 
1750-1850 (reprint, London, 1981), pp. 138-45, 208, 220-21, 225. 
38
 J. D. Chambers and G. Mingay, The Agricultural Revolution, 1750-1880 (London, 1966), p. 
92. 
39
 A. Brundage, The Making of the New Poor Law (New Brunswick, N.J., 1978), pp. 7, 10. 
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adopted either of these acts. The cross-sectional evidence suggests that 
farmers used their power to pass some of their labor costs on to non-
labor-hiring ratepayers. 
Wage rates for unskilled laborers in London increased more rapidly 
than agricultural wage rates in southern England from the 1770s to the 
1830s.40 The conclusion here that the southern labor market was well 
integrated in the early nineteenth century suggests that the relative 
increase in London wage rates forced farmers to increase relief expendi-
tures to maintain a resident labor force. 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Changes in economic and political factors appear to have been a 
major cause of the rapid increase in relief expenditures from 1750 to 
1834. The results offer strong support for the revisionist analysis of the 
economic role of the Old Poor Law begun by Blaug, or indeed Polanyi. 
They contrast sharply with the analysis contained in the 1834 Report of 
the Royal Poor Law Commission. This is ironic, since the data used 
here is the Commission's own. The Commissioners neglected the 
returns because they had already concluded that the administration of 
outdoor relief was to blame for the long-term increase in relief expendi-
tures.41 The upshot was unfortunate, since their Report continues to 
influence attitudes towards social welfare. 
Appendix 
The sources of the data utilized in the empirical analysis are listed below. Shortened 
names of variables are in parentheses. 
Per Capita Relief Expenditures (Relief). Relief expenditures in 1831 (measured in 
shillings) divided by population in 1831. All data obtained from the Rural Queries. 
Unemployment Rate (Unemployment). Data on unemployment obtained from Ques-
tion 6 of the Rural Queries: "Number of Labourers generally out of employment, and 
how maintained in summer and winter?" The unemployment rate was constructed by 
taking a simple average of the summer and winter unemployment levels (assuming the 
winter unemployment level to be relevant for one-half of the year and the summer 
unemployment level for one-half) and dividing by an estimate of the total number of 
wage laborers in the parish. The latter was assumed to consist of the number of 
agricultural laborers, nonagricultural laborers, and adult males employed in handicrafts 
and retail trade, as given in the 1831 Census. 
40
 A. L. Bowley, Wages in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, 1900), 
pp. 81-83, table at end of book. 
41
 Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb maintained that the Commission's "investigation [of the 
Poor Law] was far from being impartially or judicially directed and carried out"; see English Local 
Government: English Poor Law History: The Last Hundred Years (London, 1929), pp. 85-86. The 
hypothesis would appear to be supported by the 1834 Report's selective use of information from the 
Rural Queries. 
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Laborers' Annual Wage Income (Income). Data obtained from the Rural Queries, 
Questions 8 (weekly wages for adult males), and 10 (annual income for adult males). 
Problems arose because Question 10 had a relatively low response rate. Fortunately, the 
response rate to Question 8 was nearly 100 percent. I constructed estimates of annual 
wage income for those parishes that did not answer Question 10 in the following way. 
First, the data was divided up by counties. Second, for those parishes in each county 
which had data on male summer wage rates, winter wage rates, and annual earnings, Yy, 
an estimate of annual income, Z,y, was constructed: 
Zn = 26WS + 26WW (Al) 
where: Ws = summer wage 
Ww = winter wage 
i = parish, i = 1, n n = number of parishes in county 
j = county, j = 1, 21 
A ratio Ry was then defined as 
R0 = Zy/Yij (A2) 
Each county's ratio was thus 
Rj = liRiJn (A3) 
Third, each county's ratio, Rj9 was used to construct estimates of annual earnings, YUt 
for those parishes that reported wage rates but not earnings data. 
Y0 = [26WSij + 26WWi)/Rj or Yu = ZrfRj (A4) 
The calculated Rj for each county was approximately equal to 1.0. This suggests that 
neither harvest wages nor unemployment probabilities were taken into account in the 
estimates of male income given by parish overseers in Question 10. 
Cottage Industry (Industry). Dummy variable equal to 1 if some form of cottage 
industry existed in the parish. Information on the existence of cottage industry obtained 
from Question 11 of the Rural Queries: "Have you any and what Employment for 
Women and Children?" 
Allotments: Dummy variable equal to 1 if laborers rented land on which to grow food. 
Information on the existence of allotments obtained from Question 20 of the Rural 
Queries: "Whether any land let to labourers; if so, the Quantity to each, and at what 
Rent?" 
Distance from London (London): Distance from the center of each county to London. 
Distance was measured at the county level because of the difficulty of locating 
individual parishes within counties. 
Political Power of Labor-Hiring Farmers (Farmers): The variable measures the 
percentage of parish rate-payers who were labor-hiring farmers. The number of labor-
hiring farmers is given in the 1831 Census. The number of parish rate-payers was 
estimated by assuming that all adult males not designated by the 1831 Census as 
agricultural laborers, nonagricultural laborers, or persons employed in handicrafts or 
retail trade owned enough property to be taxed. 
Density: Density is measured as population per acre. Population data was obtained 
from the Rural Queries. Data on parish acreage was obtained from the 1831 Census. 
Child Allowances, Employed Laborers Receiving Relief (Childallow, Subsidy): Child-
allow is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the parish had a system of child allowances. 
Subsidy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if laborers received relief payments while 
privately employed. Information on the existence of both practices was obtained from 
Question 24 of the Rural Queries: "Have you any, and how many, able-bodied labourers 
in the employment of individuals receiving allowance or regular relief from your parish 
on their own account, or on that of their families?" 
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Specialization in Grain Production (Grain): An estimate of the extent of grain 
production in the parish was obtained by calculating the percentage of a parish's adult 
males who were employed in agriculture (using data from the 1831 Census) and 
multiplying this figure by the relevant county's "percentage of corn crops to total 
acreage under all kinds of crops, bare fallow, and grass." Data on crop mix were 
obtained at the county level for 1866, the earliest year for which data were available, 
from Parliamentary Papers, Returns Relating to the Acreage of Land Under Crops, vol. 
60, 1866. 
Workhouse: Dummy variable equal to 1 if the parish contained a workhouse. Data 
obtained from Question 22 of the Rural Queries: "Have you a workhouse?" 
Roundsmen System (Roundsmen): Dummy variable equal to 1 if the parish used a 
roundsmen system. Data obtained from Question 27 of the Rural Queries: "Whether the 
system of roundsmen is practiced, or has been practiced?" 
Labor Rate (Rate): Dummy variable equal to 1 if the parish used a labor rate. Data 
obtained from Question 28 of the Rural Queries: "Whether laborers are apportioned 
amongst the occupiers according to the extent of occupation, acreage rent, or number of 
horses employed?" 
Per Capita Property Value (Wealth): Per capita value of real property in parish. Data 
on real property value in 1815 obtained from Parliamentary Papers, Comparative 
Account of the Population of Great Britain . . . With Annual Value of Real Property, 
1815, vol. 18, 1831. 
